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RUSSIA'S STRATEGY OF SUCCESS:
RESOURCES OF ECONOMY AND CULTURE
Dr. Alexander L. Ageev*
I must confess that the topic of our conference really has strategic
importance for all of us, in spite of the fact that history is determined
by many events such as earthquakes, winds, revolutions, crises, and so
on. These are very messy and objective events. Nevertheless, the key
to all of these events is in our minds and our solutions. The key is also
found in the cultural patterns of our thinking, our feelings and our
actions.
Our great Russian poet, Chuchev, mentioned one century ago that
the man who visits this world in its troubled time is a very blessed
man. Russia is now populated by people who are very blessed to over-
come all of their differences. Of course, I would also like to stress that
the University of Tulsa is really challenging conventional wisdom by
choosing this topic for the subject of this conference. I think the result
of these discussions will have great influence on the work and the
thinking of all of us.
I am going to give some consideration to Russian economical
culture and its influence on the prospects of Russian economic develop-
ment. Let me start with some description of the current economic
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situation because I am afraid you will ask me about some of these
subjects. That is why I will try to avoid some of these questions by an-
swering them in the beginning.
The mass media often gives us very pessimistic assessments of
Russian political and economic events. This is done, not only by West-
ern mass media, such as the respected television companies or newspa-
pers like CNN, but it is also done by the Russian mass media. Some-
times when I am deeply involved in watching television or reading
some newspapers I get a bit crazy. I think that sometimes the only
realistic and logical conclusion from all of this involvement is to pray.
But, when you come across all of these assessments and all of these
feelings, it gets a bit more funny. For example, a couple of days ago, I
read an article in Business Week where Russia was assessed as the
country with the most risky business climate. That is really funny. This
is the assessment of a very respected magazine. That is why I prefer
not to use some of our native assessments of the economic situation,
but would rather rely on the assessment of the CIA!
The Central Intelligence Agency usually provides a very realistic,
and what is more important, a very systemic assessment of the evolu-
tion of Russian economic trends. Let me quote some fragments from
one recent statement issued by the Slavic and Euro-Russian Analysis
Department of the CIA to the Technology and National Security Sub-
committee of United States Congress. If we cannot believe in Russian
assessments, if we cannot believe in mass media assessments, I think
we will see the final place to put some trust is in this assessment.
Russia's major achievements in economic reform include the following:
the Russian government removed the controls on the ways that the
majority of producers and consumers set prices; their old state authori-
ties, in allocating supplies among producers, has fallen sharply; the
government promised to privatize state property was extremely success-
ful; and the private sector is accounting for about three-fifths of the
gross domestic product, up from one-fifth in 1991. Russia's fallen
trade regiments have moved away from the old Soviet system and are
now almost free market economic organizations.
In many respects, Russian economic reforms have made enormous
progress since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Russian policy makers
are quickly learning that a tie between their fiscal and funding policies
eventually leads to a healthier and more stable economy. Some articles
in the Russian Communist newspaper, Pravda, maybe ten years ago,
reported great progress. But, of course, some analysts have seen some
areas where we have experienced less progress. A key area of these
problems is the legal progress made in passing new laws and in the
enforcement of existing legislation. The restructuring of the Russian
economy has been slow so far. Investments in new, more efficient
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factories have been minimal. This is true because we have net fixed
investments of about seven or eight percent. This is not so high.
One of the more serious problems for us is crime and corruption.
These problems are key factors in Russia's attempt to reform its politi-
cal and economic institutions. Perhaps more importantly, the growing
power of criminal groups is fueling the perception that democratic and
free market institutions are inherently corrupt. By the way, that is a
relative conclusion.
In the future, much work remains to be done. The task of restruc-
turing Russia's aging and obsolete industrial base is formidable, and it
will take years to achieve. It must be done. It is also very important
that this achievement be done largely by Russians themselves. Russia
itself must move ahead with policies that will instill enough confidence
in its future to bring the millions and billions of dollars of capital flight
back home and boost private foreign investments. So, all of these
assessments are quite relevant to the Russian economic situation.
Now I will make some additional remarks concerning our current
economic picture. We have a real gross domestic product decline. It
decreased by fifteen percent last year. Industrial output decreased by
twenty-one percent. At the same time, our exports increased by nine
percent. Imports also increased by five percent. What is more impor-
tant, real personal incomes also increased about twenty percent. A
more important structural shift is found in the share of product con-
sumption in the Russian GDP. It is now forty-five percent. It was only
thirty-three percent in 1991. All of these changes have resulted in real
growth in consumption. Nevertheless, the level of real incomes, in
proportion, is about sixty percent, compared to 1990.
Regarding very sensitive indicators, like taxes, the net taxes in
Russian GDP are twelve percent. It was twenty percent only four years
ago. These indicators show us a very gloomy economic situation for
Russia. But when we look at the great historical process, not only in
Russia, but also in the world, we can discover that our current eco-
nomic situation is much better than that of the United States during the
Great Depression. We are in a much better situation now than was
Germany after World War I, or Japan after World War II. We are also
much better than the Soviet Union after the so-called Great October
Revolution. It means that we have enough space to decline more.
I think that all the assessments and predictions that we have, the
decline in industrial output and GDP, also predict further decline. It
will happen, but I am preoccupied by one enigma. We have been
collapsing for a long time. I have heard that since 1987, Russia had
economic, political, cultural, social, ecological, and military collapses.
Since then, I and many of my colleagues in Russia have left Russia.
That is why I think there are some real scientific questions, and some
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paradoxes, in the development of the Russian economy and Russian
society. To sort things out, it is necessary to look at some of the deep
roots of Russian economic culture.
Culture could be defined as a complex of variables that are the
shaping aims and means of the behavior of economic agents. The least
of these variants is political, for all nations having similar economic
experience in getting through the same stages of technological develop-
ment. However, unique cultures face unique problems. Of course, they
are influenced by many events, first of all by successes, and especially
by repeatable successes in economic development on macro or micro
level. Of course, failures also provide some very serious influences on
economic culture because they can eliminate some part of a certain
behavior. Very serious importance is connected with the quality of
leadership in all levels of society. I have spent much effort studying
Russian and Western economic cultures. In the literature there is a
different systematization and costification of economic culture and all
of it makes sense. But for aims of economic analysis, I think we can
use three criteria to assess economic culture, its various aspects and its
traditions.
These three criteria are as follows. The first one is the potential
for mobilization of resources. The second one is the so-called
"accumulatedness of culture", by which I mean the ability of the eco-
nomic culture to accumulate different patterns of economic develop-
ment. Countries that succeed not to destroy all experiences usually
have more chances to be more successful. The third criteria is the
effectiveness of the organization of the culture, by which I mean
leadership and the ability and quality of translation of this culture. Of
course, in all speeches, it is impossible to provide a systemic and well-
proven picture of Russia's economic culture. However, let me give just
a few characteristics of the real Russian economic culture.
It seems to be very important because, in very many notebooks, in
very many scientific books, not only in the world but also in Russia,
we can find a very simplified picture of Russian economy. This simpli-
fication provides for wrong forecasting for future prospects of the
economy. These simplifications make, and provide, some ideas about
the "sleeping giant." It is also very funny. Imagine the "sleeping gi-
ant", Russia and the Russian people in very cold and very hungry
conditions. You cannot sleep in these conditions. Nevertheless, I would
like to stress five principle features of Russian economic culture.
First of all, there is the so-called "break through ability." Russia,
during this century, has proven this ability several times. Our space
program, our nuclear program, our software program, our aviation
program, and a lot of other examples of mobilization of capital re-
sources, like people, have shown Russia's capacity for solving prob-
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lems. There is only one disadvantage of this feature. It provides for a
wave-like pattern in the way of economic development.
We have very serious entrepreneurial traditions in the Russian
economic culture. There are also many assessments defining the Rus-
sian economic traditions as non-entrepreneurial, non-market traditions
belonging to a country with an extremely centralized economy. But
imagine, this assessment also has been identified with individuals like
Stalin, Lenin, Brezhnev, Chernyenko, or other very wise people. They
decided for a great nation, two or three hundred million people, despite
a very wrong application of these great abilities, to regiment a way of
life and a way of work for so many people. Of course, all the
breakthroughs we had would have been impossible with a lack of entre-
preneurial spirit. They were very specific and unique entrepreneurial
traditions, of course, a so-called Soviet-type of entrepreneurialship. It
was nevertheless the creation of new enterprises, even the creation of
new industries. It was profit-seeking behavior. It was some new combi-
nation of factors of production. It had all the necessary symptoms of
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship should be characterized by two
fundamental features.
First is the creation of new organizations and new combinations of
factors of production. Second is some level of economic freedom. The
Soviet Union had, especially since the 1960s, a rising level of econom-
ic freedom. Sometimes it is impossible even to imagine this level of
economic freedom. Now Russia is a country with the highest level of
economic freedom in the world, in general because we do not have
many limitations for entrepreneurial initiatives. This could not be born
overnight. It was tradition. It was the accumulation of different patterns
of behavior of different great people who succeeded in destroying the
common administrative system.
A very important feature of our economic culture is the two-faced
character of the Russian economy. So we have, and we had at the
time, very high-tech industries and very primitive organizations, very
primitive regions and extremely highly educated people. We also have
very stupid people. That is life, I think. Every country has this inevita-
ble combination and this duality of economic structure. It means our
technological development was a bit unique because to have economic
development, you need to sometimes have a time of destruction, a
positive destruction, and scraping off of your economic resources and
physical essences and, at least, some retraining.
In our history, even in this century, we have been forced to lose
too much. Too often we have lost all of this capital because of some
external or internal enemy. I do not mean only taxes and wars with
some external countries, but also Russia has had a very serious, and I
think very deep rooted, struggle against internal enemies like the Bol-
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sheviks. It was also a scraping of the nation's capital, even in a physi-
cal sense, when the country lost half of its cattle. It was destruction,
negative destruction, really. That is why Russians like to keep every-
thing that they succeed in taking. That is why we have some poor
populations. However, this population has a great propensity for sav-
ings, savings of financial resources and savings of some material re-
sources. These principles, these variables of economic history and
economic culture of Russia also provide very strong motivations for the
population to have economic successes in their personal life. Just out of
Moscow you can find many new houses and construction of houses. In
ten years you will not recognize the suburbs of Moscow. That is also a
reason and that is an economic tradition.
There is a Russian economic variable, a high level of centraliza-
tion. Russia has several diversified regions. In our current situation, it
is an inevitable evil because only ten regions are really material profit
regions. Regions like Oleg, Moscow, and St. Petersburg will provide
money and different financial materials for some other regions that are
in a depressed state. It is impossible to divide all these regions into
states, some of which are more prosperous and some of which are less
prosperous. It is necessary to have a high level of redistribution of
economic health. There are some external threats. This country needs
to have some level of expenses for externalities and for some problems
of security.
The last important feature of Russian economic culture is open-
ness. In spite of the different worlds and different Communist barriers,
Russia was, and is, a very open country. We can see this openness in
the expansion of many Russian organizations to Europe, throughout the
world, even near Oklahoma. Our leading oil company, Lukoil, estab-
lished a new headquarters. This is also an example of the expansion of
Russians into the world. We can describe different flaws of this open-
ness, but maybe while they are more important, if we try to analyze
the structure of the American population, we can find a lot of people
with Russian backgrounds. Well-known civitologist Marshall Goldman
mentioned that Russia has somehow enriched many countries with
musicians, poets, engineers, and even politicians. However, Russia has
received no payments for all these gifts.
As to the so-called market transition and the changes in Russian
economic culture connected with all these changes, I think there are
maybe a couple of necessary remarks. First of all, until the 1960s, a
majority of market functions in the field of investments, pricing, and
allocation of resources was incorporated by the state, more exactly by
some state departments, ministries, and other organizations. Since the
1960s, more and more of those functions were transformed in favor of
the "invisible hand." Even in the 1980s, we had a market economy
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that was driven by this "invisible hand." It was impossible to do it
overnight. That is very important to consider. Of course, some reforms
- some shock therapy - were important instruments. Nevertheless, it
was not the only, or even the main feature, of the Russian transition to
a new type of market economy.
Making some conclusions concerning Russian economic culture, I
would like to stress two important things. First, we have an economic
culture that has a very deeply rooted market character. Expressions of
this market character have been quite different at many times. Some-
times we can face very unusual forms of market economy and entre-
preneurship. By nature, all of these expressions were market expres-
sions. That is why these conclusions are very optimistic in favor of en-
trepreneurship and market economy. The Russian economic culture
was a culture of victories in many cases, not only failures.
Now all these victories can be found in Russian competitive indus-
tries. It is also a very popular myth about Russia that it has an incom-
petent economy. That idea is extremely wrong. Russia has a very large
package of competitive advantages. I do not speak about the well-
known Russian advantages in the raw materials sector or about
Russia's boundless space, or even about the Russian labor force. Some-
times, unfortunately, the knowledge of all these advantages has a nega-
tive political guise. I keep in mind many talks with highly respected
Russian politicians who often were acquainted with Russian economic
realities only through nord books or through comics. I was lucky be-
cause I got some knowledge about the real economic life in Russia in
the many companies I visited in many regions. I have a comparative
picture of the real life in companies in the United States, South Korea,
the United Kingdom, and Germany. One can make a well-grounded
conclusion: Russia possesses many serious and highly competitive
companies and some important industries, like aviation. About six
months ago, we had one very interesting experience. A few dozen
engineers and workers from American aerospace companies were
working in some Russian aerospace companies. We discovered that
there were no differences between their skills or their culture. They
were similar to each other and had the same level of economic compe-
tence.
In general, competitiveness means the ability to produce and to sell
products and services in the world market. Russia has unique abilities
in space, aviation, telecommunications, transportation, technological
equipment, and software. Possessing all these advantages, Russia is a
real member of the world club of competitive industries. However,
there is one very sensitive point in this assessment.
Almost all Russian competitive ventures are allocated in so-called
"strategic" industries, and they are still politically very sensitive. Even
1995]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Russia's raw materials sector is still politically very sensitive. News-
week wrote, maybe one month ago, that- the United States tried to
prevent European countries from becoming dependent on Russian
sources, particularly natural gas, in the 1970s. Today, Prom provides
about one-fourth of all the natural gas for Western Europe and about
100% of the natural gas for Eastern Europe. This is a really competi-
tive industry. The Newsweek article assessed that Prom is one of the
best world companies. It is driven and managed by real professionals.
Other industries also have the same kind of companies who are leaders
in technological and economical development. Many of them are not
known to the world market because they were closed industries and
because the internal market demand was quite sufficient for them until
beginning of the 1990s. I would like to mention Lukoil, Amarazi Oil,
and Best Russian Aviation Enterprises as a few examples. Many of
these companies will soon become transnational companies. They will
be real economic successes and real economic miracles of Russia.
The involvement of these industries in very hot political issues
makes us more sensitive to understanding the prospects of cooperation
between Russia and Western countries. Of course, these industries
made great contributions to the creation of Soviet military munitions.
More than sixty-five percent of machinery industries were producers of
armaments. We do not have information that all these military indus-
tries provided 100% of all consumer goods. They were the embodi-
ment of the best human and physical capital.
When we consider the condition of our corporations in different
competitive industries, we can find three different types of situations.
The first type is a corporation in the oil and gas field or some other
strategic minerals industry. These corporations have extremely favor-
able business conditions with many investments, a large amount of
credit, and numerous joint ventures. There is enough cooperation.
These industries are a priority for joint ventures with almost all West-
ern countries. The second type are some of the traditional industries,
such as textiles, electrical equipment, and transportation. Here we are
faced with, in many situations, some very unpleasant discrimination.
Third, in the high-tech industries, there is really a lot of unequal gain.
These industries are the real Russian economic future. Without devel-
oping all these industries, we cannot survive. There will be too high a
price, the price of destruction of the best technological traditions. If
these industries are destroyed, the damage will affect the entire world
because science has a global character, and global industries share this
global character. That is why I consider saving these industries to be
an important global problem.
Today there are too many countries in the world trying to become
high-tech countries. For us, it is not an empty question of who will be
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our allies or who will be our partners. What is the ability of current
economic development, which is really a colonial-type of development,
to help us? We are too dependent on world prices of oil and gas. That
is not good because some of our other industries are in real decline. It
is in our deep national interest to develop all these industries: space,
bydiculture, new materials, telecommunications, computers, and some
other industries. This deep national interest poses a question of great
responsibility for those who create partitions in our countries.
Fortunately, there is enough evidence that there is a process of
cooperation. Some signs make me a bit more optimistic in this field be-
cause we have good cooperation in aviation. We now have much more
cooperation in the field of certification for aircraft and our economies
are very compatible in this field. Moreover, there are the classified
subjects, like prediction of coming wars. Of course, tanks, submarines,
and airplanes are the equipment of old world wars. In this century, we
will see new, very principled wars or struggles with new military
equipment based on microprocessors, telecommunications, and other
extremely high-tech technologies. Russia has some very serious
achievements in this field. During my visits to government offices in
Oklahoma and Colorado during our negotiations with some companies,
I expressed a very unusual idea about cooperation, even in the military
aviation field. We could produce a common fighter, for example the F-
29, a combination of the F-22 and the MiG-29. This would be a viable
solution since markets are shrinking and competition, unfair competi-
tion, is dangerous for both sides. The Europeans are trying to produce
the Eurofighter for the next century. But even this so-called "fighter of
the future" will be no better than our current MiG-29.
There is no reason to waste all these resources. If there are some
new threats to the national security of the United States or Russia, and
if they are not connected with our different types of cold wars, we
should combine and increase our cooperation in the field of military
aviation. These attempts will make it possible to establish a real basis
for friendship and partnership.
It is a strange package of ideas: economic culture, competitive-
ness, and Euro-politics. Culture provides too many ways for even
thinking of our politicians. Summarizing all the things I have said,
there is one Russian principle of assessment left - a sense of life that
means the combination of a pessimistic way of thinking and an optimis-
tic way of acting. I think only this combination can provide real eco-
nomic success. Russia is going this way.
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